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The paper presents series of medium term economic simulations, evaluating fiscal costs of
different EMU entry scenarios for six of the new EU members. Projections cover period of 2004-
2012 and use basic macroeconomic equations in an attempt to assess the value of public debt-
related costs that may occur in each of the countries, under specific assumptions. Four series of
simulations were run, assuming two different EMU entry dates (2007 and 2012), and two growth
scenarios  (2%  and  5%  of  real  GDP  growth  p.a.).  For  each  growth  variant  the  early  and  late
accession projections are compared in order to evaluate the net fiscal effect of delaying the EMU
entry. Those effects depend on country’s starting position and are quite significant for most of the
countries  in  question.  Poland  and  Hungary  are  the  biggest  winners  of  the  earlier  EMU  entry
simulations, both saving equivalence of 18-20% of their 2004 GDP levels (as compared to results
of the late accession scenarios). It appears that the GDP growth rate does not seriously affect the
volume of the gains, which are rather generated by the faster interest rate reduction and tighter
fiscal policies in case of the earlier EMU accession. 
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1. Introduction
This paper contains comparative analysis of fiscal costs that can result from a delay in EMU
accession. The analysis covers Central and Eastern Europe countries that joined the European
Union on May 1
st, 2004. The approach of the paper is simple - it contains simulation covering main
economic indicators for the countries in question. The costs of the public debt are evaluated for the
period from 2004 up to the year 2012. The macroeconomic projection is calculated separately for
two  different  dates  of  the  EMU  accession  -  in  the  first  scenario,  it  is  assumed  that  the  CEE
countries  will  join  the  EMU  in  the  year  2007,  while  the  second  scenario  assumes  that  the
accession will take place in year 2012. The projection is based on today’s amounts of public debt
and budget deficit, the debt structure, and the interest rates level. It also includes assumptions on
the future values of GDP growth (fast and slow growth options), the budget deficit, and the interest
rates. The level of public debt at the end of projection period, together with the total costs of the
debt service during the years covered, are the projection’s output.
It must be stressed, however, that the numerical predictions of the future GDP (or deficit, or
interest rates) paths are not the aim of the analysis. The goal of the projection is to provide data for
comparison, both between  the  different  EMU  accession  scenarios,  and  the  new  EU  members.
Aiming at comparable result leads, however, to  some  simplification  of the model.  Comparative
simulation, not accurate forecast, is the underlying goal, so one should not treat some of the final
years’ numbers as a strict reflection of author’s views.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II explains the main economic mechanisms
that increase the fiscal costs in case of delay of the EMU accession. In Sections III and IV a formal
description of the simulation mechanism is provided, followed by detailed assumptions on input
data (which are the real GDP growth, the primary budget deficit or surplus, and the interest rate).
Sections V-VII present the results of the two accession scenarios, both according to the fast growth
assumption, that vary by different EMU entry dates. The development path of public debt and the
total costs of debt service are presented for each country and  scenario. Section VIII describes
results of analogical simulations performed under the slow growth assumption, with the detailed
results available in Appendix 1. Finally, the last section compares the effects of the two versions of
the analysis. The main conclusion of the paper is that the sooner the EMU accession date, the
stronger the incentives for the policymakers to carry out fiscal adjustments that would result in
significant  savings  in  the  near  future.  Additionally,  the  earlier  accession  date  means  a  faster
decrease in the interest rates, which also substantially reduces costs of the debt service. ThereforeStudies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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faster  EMU  accession  is  equivalent  to  a  considerable  fiscal  savings  for  most  of  the  countries
analyzed in this paper.
2. Fiscal costs of the delay of EMU membership
They  are  several  reasons,  for  which  the  delay  in  joining  the  monetary  union  may  impose
additional fiscal costs. The strongest of them are strictly connected to the conditions that are to be
fulfilled by all candidate countries. The Maastricht criteria must be met no later than two years
before joining the EMU. Among others, these criteria define maximum levels of public debt and
fiscal  deficit,  which  must  not  be  exceeded.  It  is  assumed  in  the  projection,  that  the  candidate
countries will do their best in order to reduce the debt to the permitted level, or - for those that are
not  endangered  by  excessive  debt  to  GDP  ratio  -  will  keep  it  at  some  predefined  level,  at  a
specified date of the two years before accession to the EMU. The date of the accession is the main
determinant here, as it differs amongst the EMU accession scenarios assumed in the projection.
The sooner the accession, the less time is left for meeting the criteria. Keeping the deficit (and/or
debt) below the specified level may be such a heavy effort for some countries, that governments
would rather not undertake this task quickly without the EMU accession incentive.
In other words, the perspective of EMU accession may be the factor that “forces” governments
to choose the path of faster debt reduction. If there was no accession requirement, governments
could  choose  not  to  be  so  quick  and  radical  in  cutting  their  expenditures,  or  increasing  their
revenues  (since  one  cannot  expect  decisions  that  are  healthy  for  the  economy,  but  very
unpopular). Therefore, for indebted countries, faster EMU accession may mean (as it is assumed
in this projection) a quicker path of debt reduction. The faster the debt reduction, the smaller the
amounts of yearly interest payments – according to this model, the change in the EMU entry date
clearly affects the total fiscal costs during the period in question.
In fact, the interest payments are expected to be the main element of fiscal costs that is
altered in case of change of the monetary union accession date. The difference in the final debt to
GDP ratio will be another result. In a simple model, the amounts of interest payments depend on
the amount of debt, and the interest rate itself. The method used in the projection follows this
mechanism. This is an obvious simplification, since the amount of debt plus the level of interest
rate may be used to calculate interest payments on one’s bank credit, rather than to determine
substantial positions of countries’ budgetary expenditures - which would depend on debt structure
and  market  conditions.  However,  the  method  adopted  for  the  projection  (i)  allows  for  clear 
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comparisons, as interest payments for all countries are evaluated according to the same rules, and
(ii) makes it possible to employ other reasonable assumptions
1.
Since both of the two main factors that influence the long-term behavior of interest rates (the
monetary policy and the expectations concerning the interest rate levels) are strongly connected to
the planed date of monetary union accession, it may be assumed that the interest rates should be
treated  in  this  projection  according  to  the  same  main  assumption  as  the  public  debt:  the
convergence path depends on the date of the accession. This means, that the sooner the EMU
joining date, the lower the debt service fiscal costs.
3. Model description
The projection mechanism uses the basic macroeconomic equations. The current level of debt
depends on the debt from previous period, plus the current fiscal balance. The interest rate has
impact on interest payments, and a change of the “domestic to foreign” interest rate ratio alters the
exchange  rate.  Exchange  rate  changes  determine  the  domestic  currency  value  of  the  debt
denominated in foreign currency. Additional, more specific assumptions formalize the model: it is
assumed, that the terms “domestic debt” and “the debt denominated in domestic currency” are the
same, just as “foreign debt” is the “foreign currency debt”. The fiscal deficit, finally, increases the
domestic debt, and if a surplus occurs – it reduces the foreign part. The debt and deficit values are
shown in relative terms, as a proportion of GDP – so growth in the latter reduces the debt ratio:
Dd = Dd, t-1 / (1+g) * (1+r) - B; where:
Dd - domestic debt (as a percent of GDP),
g – the real GDP growth rate,
r - interest rate,
B - primary fiscal balance (deficit has minus sign; as a percent of GDP).
Similarly, for foreign debt:
Df = Df, t-1 / (1+g) * (1+r) * (1+∆E); where:
Df - foreign debt,
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E - exchange rate; and
(1+∆E) - exchange rate loss factor.
(1+∆E) represents the exchange rate depreciation
2 factor, (E/Et-1), and equals to (1+r)/(1+rw),
where rw is the "world", i.e. external real interest rate. The projection uses this formal, exact formula
instead of the simplified uncovered interest parity equation, according to which r = r w+ ∆E (and
where the exchange rate gains on interest payments are ignored).
4. Detailed assumptions on input data
This part of the paper describes the input data of the projection, which are the accession year
and the paths of GDP, primary fiscal balance and interest rate.
The projection compares two EMU accession scenarios. These scenarios differ by the EMU
accession date; which is 2007 in the faster scenario (so the Maastrich criteria must be met as early
as in 2005), or 2012 (2010, respectively). In case of countries that are not endangered by breaking
any of the criteria, the public debt to GDP ratio is assumed not to be in a worse position than it was
prior to the beginning of the projection.
The most problematic assumptions of the projection are those concerning the GDP growth
paths. Since the prediction of the real GDP future values is far beyond the scope of this paper, the
comparability of the results was the most important criterion. Exogenous paths of the GDP growth
were finally chosen, including two variants of the growth rate value: 5% and 2% per annum through
the whole projection period. Therefore, simulations for all countries are performed twice, under the
fast and slow growth assumptions (see sections V-VIII). The term “GDP growth” refers to the real
values, anywhere in this paper.
It shall be noted that in the search for an objective growth measure, reflecting both countries’
starting positions and reasonable estimations of future real GDP paths, solution based on recent
GDP  behavior  was  also  taken  into  account
3.  However,  this  would  make  the  whole  projection
extremely  dependable  on  country’s  economy  performance  in  the  last  years,  which  could  be
considered both as a benefit (because the future does depend on the starting position) and as a
disadvantage (… but to which extent?) of the model.
                                                          
2 Appreciation, if the domestic interest rates were lower than “foreign”.
3 To be specific, an average growth from three years preceding the projection was assumed for the first years, increased
by one percentage point from the year 2006 – as an expected outcome of the EU membership. 
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For each country, the path of the primary fiscal deficit  values makes an  input  data. The
series are modeled separately, and are altered in order to achieve the target deficit/debt values at
the appropriate year, 2005 or 2010. It is assumed, that the fastest possible path of primary deficit
reduction is by 1% of GDP p.a. For heavily indebted countries it could become necessary to have
subsequent  budget  surpluses  –  however,  it  would  not  be  realistic  to  expect  them  to  reach
“abnormally”  high  levels,  even  while  following  the  fastest  debt  reduction  path.  Since  even  the
toughest  debt-reducing  policy  reaches  its  limits
4,  the  maximum  level  of  the  budget  surplus  is
defined at 2% of GDP. This value refers to the total fiscal balance, including the interest payments.
Also, the overall fiscal balance cannot be in a surplus (i.e. primary surplus must not be greater than
the interest payments) after the assessment year (2005 vs. 2010), or after the debt to GDP ratio
reaches its target
5 value, which may occur later in some scenarios. From such moment the debt
reduction policy is to be terminated. This last condition allows for comparison of fiscal results of
different accession scenarios.
The interest rate on the public debt assumed in the projection is the same for both domestic
and foreign debt. It changes according to the linear function, that allows to reach the target value
one year before the accession date – this means, that convergence ends when it is obvious that
joining the EMU will take place, and the expected interest rate equals to the foreign rate. The
„world” interest rate stays on the constant level during the whole projection period, and equals to
4% p.a. This is also the target value for the interest rate on the public debt. The proportion of the
foreign and domestic interest rates determines the change of the exchange rate.
The  source  of  all  the  data  used  in  the  projection  was  the  IMF.  Two  databases  were  used:
Government Finance Statistics for the fiscal deficit, domestic/foreign debt and interest payments, and
International Financial Statistics in case of GDP values and interest rates
6. The debt/deficit ratios were
calculated using the year’s nominal values, while the GDP growth is in real terms. The primary fiscal
deficit, used in the projection, was obtained by adding the interest payment values to the overall fiscal
balance, both as shown in IMF GFS.
Few  words  must  be  said  about  the  “interest  rate”  values.  In  order  to  achieve  comparable
results, the data used in projection should origin from one source, according to a single definition.
The lack of appropriate statistical data that could be used for projection purposes (and would be
available for all the countries in question) forces to choose a specific measure. The interest rate
used to calculate both the interest payments, and the exchange rate development, is defined as an
average  of  lending  and  deposit  interest  rates,  as  published  by  the  IMF.  There  are  two  main
                                                          
4 …even sooner in countries that are seriously underinvested, as compared to the rest of the European Union…
5 The “target debt to GDP ratio” is to be defined in Section V.
6 The GFS debt figures may differ from IFS numbers. In case of discrepancies, the GFS values were used.Studies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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advantages of this method
7: such measure both (i) is available, and (ii) produces results close to
the actual interest payments, as it can be checked for the years prior to the projection period.
5. Fast growth, late accession - results of the first scenario
The following tables present results of the first projection – with fast pace of growth (5% p.a.) and the
later accession date (2012). The target debt to GDP ratio is to be achieved two years earlier. Primary
deficit, the real GDP growth rate and the interest rates are the input data; domestic and foreign parts of
the public debt are the model outcome. The deficit is added to the domestic debt, and the foreign part is
enlarged  due  to  the  exchange  losses.  Both  parts  of  the  debt  are  increased  by  interest  payments.
Additionally, the “exchange rate index” describes the change of exchange rate, assuming that the local to
foreign currency rate at the end of year 2003 is equal to 1. The goal is to have the debt to GDP ratio at
the ”assessment” year (2010 in this scenario) not greater than prior
8 to the projection period.
Table 1. Poland, fast growth, late accession scenario
Poland 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.7% 0.1% 0.9% 1.7% 2.5% 3.3% 4.2% 1.7% 1.6%
Domestic Debt 31.6% 32.3% 32.9% 33.3% 33.6% 33.6% 33.5% 33.1% 32.8%
Foreign Debt 20.5% 21.6% 21.6% 20.7% 18.6% 15.5% 11.3% 9.5% 7.8%
Total Debt 52.1% 53.9% 54.6% 54.0% 52.2% 49.1% 44.8% 42.7% 40.7%
Interest Rate 8.0% 7.4% 6.9% 6.3% 5.7% 5.1% 4.6% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.14 1.18 1.21 1.24 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.28 1.28
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
As it can be seen in case of Poland, the goal of debt reduction to the pre-projection level (of
44.8% of GDP) may be reached in 2010, however quite fast primary deficit reduction path (0.8% of
GDP p.a.) must be adopted. The total fiscal balance reaches the maximum allowed level, +2% of
the GDP, in 2010. The debt ratio rises up to 2006 due to overall budget deficits, caused by interest
payments and the exchange losses on the foreign part of the debt. Substantial surpluses that are
achieved  later,  together  with  a  decrease  in  the  interest  rate  level,  allow  for  accelerated  debt
reduction in the following years. Primary surplus growth is terminated in year 2010, when the target
debt to GDP ratio is reached. Last two years bring a surplus reduction, as an overall surplus is not
                                                          
7  A  measure  based  on  average  lending/deposit  rates  leads,  of  course,  to  some  simplification  –  that  is,  however,
necessary. Since it would be possible to use the current interest rates on debt, resulting from debt settlements, the
evaluations of future interest rate values (or the results of future repayment negotiations) stand far beyond the scope of
this paper.
8 In most cases, 2002 – the date depends on data availability. 
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to occur, and the primary surplus shown in the table above reflects only the interest payments
value - so the nominal value of the debt stays unchanged. Under such conditions Poland is not
endangered by not reaching any of the assumed goals.
Table 2. The Czech Republic, fast growth, late accession scenario
Czech Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.7% -0.5% -0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6%
Domestic Debt 17.9% 18.2% 18.3% 18.1% 18.0% 17.8% 17.4% 16.5% 15.7%
Foreign Debt 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 19.0% 19.3% 19.4% 19.2% 18.8% 18.2% 17.3% 16.5% 15.7%
Interest Rate 4.2% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
For much less indebted Czech Republic, the object of not exceeding the current
9 debt to GDP
ratio at 2010 is much easier to achieve. In order to obtain this goal, the deficit reduction must follow
the modest path of 0.23% percentage point p.a. The country takes the advantage of moderate
level of debt at the start of the projection, and – mostly – very low interest rate, not much higher
than the “foreign” target rate at the beginning of the period in question. A small overall surplus is
achieved in 2010, which – due to lack of the foreign debt at the moment – reduces the nominal
value of the domestic part.
Table 3. The Slovak Republic, fast growth, late accession scenario
Slovak Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 1.4% 1.3%
Domestic Debt 28.3% 28.9% 29.3% 29.5% 29.7% 29.7% 29.5% 29.2% 29.0%
Foreign Debt 11.5% 11.6% 11.5% 10.9% 10.0% 8.7% 7.0% 5.6% 4.2%
Total Debt 39.8% 40.5% 40.7% 40.4% 39.6% 38.3% 36.5% 34.8% 33.1%
Interest Rate 7.5% 7.0% 6.5% 6.0% 5.5% 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.20 1.22 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Just  a  bit  faster  debt  reduction  path  (GDP  0.26%  p.a.)  would  be  necessary  in  the  Slovak
Republic. This country starts with debt twice as high as in the Czech Republic, and suffers from
higher  initial  interest  rates.  As  for  preceding  countries,  during  the  final  years  covered  by  the
simulation the assumed rate of GDP growth is higher than the interest rate, so the domestic debt to
GDP ratio would fall (in real terms) even if the interest payments would not covered by the primary
                                                          
9 2002 figure – as the latest available from IMF databases.Studies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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surplus (faster real debt/GDP ratio reduction in the Czech Republic was caused by the fact that the
foreign debt was reduced to zero during the projection period, and a budget surplus reduced the
domestic part). The total fiscal balance never reaches surplus during the period covered. The only
reason of so small difference in the annual deficit reduction value between the Czech and Slovak
republics is that the latter starts with primary surplus.
Table 4. Hungary, fast growth, late accession scenario
Hungary 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%
Domestic Debt 42.7% 43.6% 44.3% 44.8% 45.0% 45.1% 44.9% 44.4% 44.0%
Foreign Debt 15.2% 14.7% 13.9% 12.8% 11.5% 9.9% 8.2% 6.3% 4.4%
Total Debt 58.0% 58.3% 58.2% 57.6% 56.5% 55.0% 53.1% 50.8% 48.4%
Interest Rate 7.7% 7.2% 6.7% 6.1% 5.6% 5.1% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.13 1.16 1.19 1.22 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
The debt to GDP ratio of Hungary at the beginning of the projection is similar to the one in
Poland. However, Hungary’s budget notes primary surpluses at the start of the projection, which
substantially accelerates the debt reduction, and allows for keeping the 2010’ debt at the original
level at a very low “cost” of primary surplus increase by 0.08 percent of GDP p.a. Termination of this
increase after 2010 would not allow for balancing the overall budget, so the trend continues to the
end of the simulation. Primary surplus reaches the level of the interest payments in the final year.
Table 5. Slovenia, fast growth, late accession scenario
Slovenia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.0% 1.0%
Domestic Debt 16.1% 16.4% 16.7% 16.9% 17.0% 17.0% 16.9% 16.7% 16.6%
Foreign Debt 14.9% 14.9% 14.5% 13.8% 12.7% 11.3% 9.5% 8.4% 7.4%
Total Debt 31.0% 31.3% 31.2% 30.6% 29.6% 28.2% 26.4% 25.2% 24.0%
Interest Rate 7.8% 7.3% 6.7% 6.2% 5.6% 5.1% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.15 1.19 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
As Slovak Republic and Hungary, Slovenia enjoys primary budget surplus at the beginning of
the projection. This allows for only a moderate increase of primary fiscal balance by 0.18% of GDP
p.a. The budget reaches a small total surplus prior to the assessment year, so the deficit reduction
trend may be reversed in 2011. 
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The situation of Baltic countries is quite similar, as all three started their independence with
zero debt accounts. All note small interest rates. The figures for Latvia are presented below, the
results for Lithuania and Estonia will be discussed later.
Table 6. Latvia, fast growth, late accession scenario
Latvia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5%
Domestic Debt 6.3% 6.5% 6.5% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 6.3% 6.2%
Foreign Debt 9.8% 9.9% 10.0% 9.9% 9.6% 9.1% 8.5% 7.8% 7.2%
Total Debt 16.1% 16.4% 16.4% 16.3% 16.0% 15.5% 14.8% 14.1% 13.4%
Interest Rate 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 4.7% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Latvia has no causes to worry. According to the projection, cutting the primary deficit by small
0.14% of GDP p.a. allows for returning to the starting debt/GDP ratio level at 2010. It is possible
due to moderate debt level, small primary deficit and low interest rates at the beginning of the
projection. The overall budget deficit disappears in 2010, so there is no later need for any primary
deficit reduction.
The  final  results  for  all  the  countries  may  be  seen  in  table  7.  It  contains  three  indicators
describing the performance of each country. Statistics called “surplus” adds up the annual primary
fiscal balances in the whole projection period (2004-2012), corrected by the real GDP growth path
values, in order to present it as a percent to the 2004 GDP. “Debt” means the 2012 value of the
total debt burden, in relation to the 2004 GDP level (real numbers). “Payments” describe the real
interest payments in the period 2004-2012, as a percent of 2004 GDP. As with the surplus, it is the
sum of yearly interest payments, as a proportion to current GDP values, corrected by the real GDP
growth  numbers.  All  three  synthetic  measures  will  allow  for  clear  comparisons  of  the  different
scenarios results, in the later part of the paper. It must be noted, however, that none of these
measures were discounted by the interest rate values.
Additionally,  the  “deficit  path”  column  reminds  the  yearly  reduction  of  primary  deficit  (or
increase of primary surplus; as a percent of GDP) assumed during the years prior to reaching the
target debt ratio, in the presented simulations. The “71.5” value of the Hungarian “Debt” measure is
not a strange figure, since it is the 2012 debt amount compared to the 2004 GDP number (in the
real terms). The actual 2012 debt to GDP ratio of this country is less than 50%, in this part of the
projection.Studies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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Table 7. Fast growth, late accession scenario results; synthetic measures.
Columns 2-4: percent of 2004 GDP. Column 5: percent of GDP
Surplus Debt Payments Deficit path
Poland 20.2% 60.1% 30.1% 0.81%
Czech Republic 2.2% 23.2% 7.8% 0.23%
Slovak Republic 11.5% 49.0% 22.1% 0.26%
Hungary 17.7% 71.5% 32.6% 0.08%
Slovenia 12.9% 35.4% 17.3% 0.18%
Latvia 3.1% 19.8% 7.4% 0.14%
Source: own calculations. Real numbers.
6. The early accession scenario
The second scenario assumes much faster EMU accession (in year 2007), so the debt target
must be reached as soon as in 2005. The interest rate decrease (in order to reach the target level)
is much faster, and must occur in years 2004-2005. This substantially reduces both the interest
payments and the exchange losses (on foreign debt) during the whole projection period; the latter
in fact do vanish from 2005 onwards. As in the previous scenario, the deficit reduction policy ends
after the moment of assessment (2005 in this part of the projection), if possible. In case of the debt
to GDP ratio higher than the target value, and/or the total budget deficit in 2005, the primary deficit
reduction (or surplus increase) is to be continued until both of the conditions are fulfilled. Beyond
this moment the overall fiscal surplus is assumed to be zero (primary surplus equals to the interest
payments, so the nominal value of the debt stays the same). The real GDP growth assumption
stays the same: by 5%, annually.
Table 8. Poland, fast growth, early accession scenario
Poland 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.5% 0.5% 1.5% 2.5% 1.1% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5%
Domestic Debt 31.1% 31.3% 31.0% 30.7% 30.4% 30.1% 29.8% 29.5% 29.3%
Foreign Debt 20.2% 20.1% 18.3% 15.7% 14.4% 12.6% 10.8% 9.2% 7.6%
Total Debt 51.3% 51.4% 49.3% 46.4% 44.8% 42.7% 40.7% 38.7% 36.9%
Interest Rate 7.1% 5.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Although the projection’s goal could be achieved in the previous scenario, it cannot be reached
now, even after adopting the fastest possible deficit reduction path of GDP 1% p.a. Because there
was much less time for the debt reduction, the assessment year (2005) debt value exceeds the 
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assumed number. The pre-projection, target value is achieved as late as in 2008, when the primary
surplus increase may be stopped (and the trend may be even reversed for this year). This date is
however acceptable, since Poland did not come even close to the maximum allowed level (60%) of
debt to GDP ratio, during none of the years covered by the simulation. The bold numbers in the
Table 8 indicate the development of debt to GDP ratio from the assessment year to the moment
when  it  reaches  its  target  value;  the  same  pattern  will  be  used  in  the  following  tables.  Small
primary surplus decrease may occur in Poland from 2010.
Table 9. The Czech Republic, fast growth, early accession scenario
Czech Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Domestic Debt 17.2% 17.1% 16.4% 15.7% 14.9% 14.2% 13.5% 12.9% 12.3%
Foreign Debt 1.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 18.3% 17.3% 16.4% 15.6% 14.9% 14.2% 13.5% 12.9% 12.3%
Interest Rate 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
The Czech Republic must cut its deficit in 2004-2005 by substantial 0.9% of GDP p.a., if the
goal of having the assumed debt/GDP ratio is to be obtained in 2005. Then the primary surplus
may be reduced, and slowly decrease. The foreign part of the debt is finally repaid in 2006.
Table 10. The Slovak Republic, fast growth, early accession scenario
Slovak Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.4% 1.0% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1%
Domestic Debt 28.1% 28.2% 27.9% 27.7% 27.4% 27.2% 26.9% 26.6% 26.4%
Foreign Debt 11.0% 10.2% 8.6% 7.1% 5.7% 4.4% 3.1% 2.0% 0.9%
Total Debt 39.1% 38.4% 36.5% 34.8% 33.1% 31.5% 30.0% 28.6% 27.2%
Interest Rate 6.7% 5.3% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Trying to catch up with the original debt to GDP ratio (36.5%), the Slovak Republic would have
to adopt the fastest path of the deficit reduction (or surplus increase) of one percentage point p.a.
However, even such effort would not allow for obtaining the right result, and the debt in 2005 would
still exceed the desired level. Moving the target date to 2006 allows for fulfilling the debt/GDP ratio
requirements at lower cost of GDP 0.56% of annual increase of primary surplus – and this path is
to  be  used  in  the  projection,  in  order  to  avoid  rapid  changes  of  budget  balance  near  theStudies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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assessment date. Since the total debt value is far from any alarming limits, there is nothing wrong
in achieving its target level one year later than assumed. From 2007 the primary surplus path
allowing for (and only for) interest payments contains slightly decreasing values.
Table 11. Hungary, fast growth, early accession scenario
Hungary 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 1.5% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6%
Domestic Debt 42.4% 42.5% 42.1% 41.7% 41.3% 40.9% 40.5% 40.2% 39.6%
Foreign Debt 14.7% 13.2% 11.0% 8.8% 6.8% 4.9% 3.1% 1.4% 0.0%
Total Debt 57.1% 55.7% 53.1% 50.6% 48.2% 45.9% 43.7% 41.6% 39.6%
Interest Rate 6.8% 5.4% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Hungary would miss some 0.6 percentage point in order to achieve the target debt to GDP
ratio in 2005, despite the assumption of the fastest primary surplus growth. The good thing is that
adopting the moderate path of 0.3% of GDP p.a. allows for reaching the desired debt level just one
year later, as it was in case of the Slovak Republic. Faster (than in the previous scenario) reduction
of the interest rates does allow for accelerated fall of the debt ratio in the following years, even
without any repayments.
Table 12. Slovenia, fast growth, early accession scenario
Slovenia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 1.1% 1.6% 2.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8%
Domestic Debt 15.9% 16.0% 15.8% 15.7% 15.5% 15.4% 15.2% 15.1% 14.9%
Foreign Debt 14.3% 12.9% 10.5% 9.4% 8.4% 7.4% 6.5% 5.6% 4.7%
Total Debt 30.2% 28.9% 26.4% 25.1% 23.9% 22.8% 21.7% 20.7% 19.7%
Interest Rate 6.9% 5.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.14 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
The situation of Slovenia is similar to the one of Hungary and the Slovak Republic – reaching
the target debt to GDP ratio at the end of 2005 is not possible, but achieving this goal in 2006 does
not require too excessive effort. The required step of the primary surplus increase is 0.6% p.a.
Table 13. Latvia, fast growth, early accession scenario
Latvia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
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Deficit (-) or surplus 0.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4%
Domestic Debt 6.1% 6.0% 6.0% 5.9% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.6%
Foreign Debt 9.6% 8.8% 8.1% 7.5% 6.9% 6.4% 5.8% 5.3% 4.9%
Total Debt 15.6% 14.8% 14.1% 13.4% 12.8% 12.2% 11.6% 11.0% 10.5%
Interest Rate 4.9% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
As in the first scenario, Latvia has no problems at all. The target debt/GDP value is reached at
2005 by increasing the 2004-2005 primary surpluses by 0.6% of GDP in the consequent years.
Lack of total fiscal deficit allows for financing the interest payments from the primary surplus only in
the rest of the projection period.
Table  14  summarizes  results  of  the  faster  EMU  accession  scenario,  presenting  measures
calculated analogically to those of Table 7:
Table 14. Fast growth, early accession scenario results; synthetic measures.
Columns 2-4: percent of 2004 GDP. Column 5: percent of GDP
Surplus Debt Payments Deficit path
Poland 14.7% 54.5% 21.4% 1.00%
Czech Republic 6.0% 18.1% 6.5% 0.90%
Slovak Republic 12.8% 40.2% 15.8% 0.56%
Hungary 19.8% 58.5% 23.2% 0.30%
Slovenia 12.2% 29.1% 11.9% 0.58%
Latvia 5.4% 15.5% 5.8% 0.60%
Source: own calculations. Real numbers.
7. Results of the fast growth analysis
Results of the simulations covering two “fast growth” EMU accession scenarios are presented
in tables 7 and 14. The “surplus”, “debt” and “payments” measures are shown in relation to the
2004 GDP level, and cover the whole simulation period (2004-2012). “Surplus” and “payments” are
the  totals  of  primary  budget  balances  and  interest  payments  that  have  occurred  during  the
projection period, corrected by the real GDP growth values in order to compare them to the 2004
GDP level; “debt” represents the 2012 public debt amount related to the 2004 GDP. Table 15
presents the difference between the numbers resulting from the two accession scenarios (numbers
from table 15 are subtracted from those in table 7, and the additional column with the total number
of the three figures was added):Studies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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Table 15. The earlier accession scenario gains.
Fast growth projection. Synthetic measures, percent of 2004 GDP
Country Surplus Debt Payments Gains
Poland 5.5% 5.6% 8.7% 19.8%
Czech Republic -3.8% 5.1% 1.3% 2.6%
Slovak Republic -1.3% 8.7% 6.3% 13.7%
Hungary -2.0% 12.9% 9.4% 20.3%
Slovenia 0.7% 6.3% 5.4% 12.5%
Latvia -2.3% 4.3% 1.6% 3.6%
Source: own calculations.
As for the Czech Republic, the numbers may be explained in the following way. Fulfilling the
second  scenario  (faster  EMU  accession)  requirements,  this  country  must  pay  the  cost  of
increasing the total of primary fiscal balances during the projection period by 3.8% of 2004
GDP,  as  compared  to  the  first  scenario  (with  later  accession).  However,  realizing  the  quicker
accession  scenario  would  result  in  reduction  of  the  2004-2012  interest  payments  by  value
equal to 1.3% of 2004 GDP (all in real terms), and the public debt at the end of the projection
period would be lower by 5.1% of 2004 GDP. So, the net total outcome of choosing the faster
EMU accession scenario instead of the later accession scenario would be 2.6% of the 2004 GDP,
as it is shown in the “Gains” column of Table 15. This last column summarizes the three previous
numbers, providing one synthetic measure of fiscal effects resulting from the earlier EMU entry.
It is worth to note that the extra cost paid by the Czech Republic, resulting from toughest fiscal
policy (meaning higher budget surpluses required in the earlier EMU accession scenario), refers to
the primary budget – so it does not include the interest payments. The difference in the latter is
therefore presented in a separate column.
It must be noted, that the primary fiscal adjustments mentioned above are to occur in the specific
years in the period 2004-2012. The statistics presented in Table 15 do not give the full picture – they
do not mean, for example, that any increase of Czech primary budget surplus by 3.8% (of 2004 GDP
level), in some of the projection-covered years, would have the expected impact on total interest
payments and the final debt reductions. The accurate paths of primary deficits/surpluses, that should
be followed in order to obtain the effects described, are presented in previous parts of the paper
(Tables 2 and 8, in case of the Czech Republic). The values in table 15 are for comparison needs
only, and should not be interpreted without its full context. Especially, no interest rate values
were taken into account during recalculation of the numbers into 2004 amounts, since the matters of
alternate usage of budgetary assets are not to be analyzed here.
The results for Poland are quite surprising. The faster EMU accession means both the interest
payments (and the final debt) reduction, and less burden for the current fiscal policy, too. All three 
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kinds of gains stem from the high initial value of the interest rate. Its rapid reduction in period 2004-
2006 (in faster accession scenario) significantly reduces the interest payments, and the exchange
rate losses on the foreign part of debt. This allows for financing the total interest payments from the
primary surplus, which is possible from the year 2009. The trend continues in the next years, so
the primary surplus may be further reduced. The increase of surplus in the late accession scenario
is not much slower than in the early accession version (0.8% instead of 1% of GDP p.a.), but lasts
three years longer, rising the primary surplus to the high value of 4.2% in 2010. It is necessary both
to finance high interest payments, and break the initial trend of budget deficits in presence of high
interest rates. One should remember than in the first, “late accession” scenario Poland needed the
fastest path of deficit reduction amongst all the analyzed countries. It may be concluded that it is
rather (very) unfavorable initial position of Poland that causes so much different result for the two
scenarios, than some special possibilities offered by the faster accession scenario.
Hungary  is  in  much  better  position,  since  it  does  not  suffer  from  primary  deficits  at  the
projection start. Therefore, there is no painful “getting-out-of-deficit” process in this country, which
could cause further debt increase, and higher interest payments or exchange losses. This is why
Hungary does not follow the Polish way; since no substantial deficit reduction was required in the
late accession scenario (but it had to occur in the second part of the simulation) the overall fiscal
effort  must be greater  in  the  2007  accession  version  (by  2.0%  of  2004  GDP,  totally).  This  is,
however, highly rewarded by astonishing reduction of debt level and interest payments, totaling to
over 22% of 2004 GDP. Relatively high GDP growth assumed in the projection clearly helps to
achieve such results.
Due to initial primary surpluses and moderate interest rate level Slovenia gains in all three
categories. The faster surplus increase realized at the beginning of the early accession projection
allows for reduction of surplus values in the following years, making the total surplus number lower
than it would be in the first (2012) scenario. A similar conclusion may concern the Slovak Republic:
although not in as good position in terms of the “surplus” statistics, it also benefits from good initial
fiscal balance and faster surplus increase in the first years or the 2007 scenario. The results for
Latvia may be described analogically to those of the Czech Republic, as those countries positions
seem to be very similar in terms of change of the accession date.
8. Analysis under the slow growth assumption
Since the future development of GDP growth paths in the countries in question may be quite
different from the assumed 5% p.a. (and their prediction clearly exceeds the scope and agenda of
this  paper),  it  was  decided  to  perform  two  versions  of  the  analysis.  The  following,  pessimisticStudies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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scenarios assume slower rate of the real GDP growth, equal to 2% p.a. in the whole projection
period. The rest of the assumptions underlying previous simulations stays unchanged, and the new
calculations are carried out, for the same EMU accession dates: 2012 and 2007. Tables 16-27
(see  Appendix  1)  present  the  detailed  results  of  simulations  performed  under  the  slow  growth
assumption.
The results of the 2% p.a. growth scenarios are quite predictable. Since slower GDP growth
means slower reduction of the debt/GDP ratio, higher budget surpluses are required in order to
control the relative debt level. Sometimes – as in case of Poland, for example – even the fastest
path allowed in the projection does not provide enough progress. The target debt level in the late
accession  scenario  for  Poland  is  substantially  exceeded  at  the  assessment  date  (2010),  and
never reached during the years covered by the projection. Moreover, the debt ratio comes close to
the 60% limit (over 58% in 2006-2007). Reduction of interest rates in the early accession scenario
allows for obtaining the projection’s goal, but as late as in 2010, five years after the scenario’s
assessment date. The highest debt level is noted in 2005, and equals to 54.4% GDP. For Poland,
see tables 16 and 22 in Appendix 1.
Czech and Slovak Republics do manage to achieve the desired debt level on time in the late
accession scenario (see tables 17, 18, 23 and 24). It requires primary surplus increase by 0.4%
and 0.6% of GDP p.a., respectively. The early accession assumption calls for the fastest surplus
increase, but there still are some delays in reaching the debt target: one year for the Czech, two in
case  of  Slovak  Republic.  Hungary  (tables  19  and  25)  follows  the  same  way,  with  the  annual
surplus increase of 0.5% of GDP in the late scenario, and two years delay in the early accession
one.  For  Slovenia  the  numbers  are:  GDP  0.4%  of  annual  surplus  increase  in  late  accession
simulation (no delay, table 20) and 2 years of shift in case of 2007 EMU accession (maximum
surplus increase path, table 26). Latvia is the only country which manages to keep the debt to GDP
ratio at the pre-projection level in the early accession scenario, by increasing the surplus by 0.9%
of GDP in 2004-2005 (and by 0.3% in the late accession scenario, tables 21 and 27).
The  tables  below  contain  the  summary  of  the  slow  growth  version  of  the  projection,  in
analogical order as it was presented in sections V and VI. Table 30 compares results of the late
and early accession simulations, as it was performed in section VII. As in the previous, fast growth
version  of  the  analysis,  the  “gains”  measure  (last  column  of  Table  30)  presents  the  net  total
outcome of choosing the faster EMU entry scenario (instead of the later accession one). In other
words, it represents the fiscal effects resulting from the earlier EMU entry, under specific conditions
assumed for the analysis.
‘ 
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Table 28. Slow growth, late accession scenario results; synthetic measures.
Columns 2-4: percent of 2004 GDP. Column 5: percent of GDP
Surplus Debt Payments Deficit path
Poland 27.4% 54.3% 30.1% 1.00%
Czech Republic 6.0% 19.5% 7.4% 0.37%
Slovak Republic 19.2% 41.1% 21.1% 0.56%
Hungary 29.2% 59.8% 31.1% 0.53%
Slovenia 18.6% 29.7% 16.5% 0.42%
Latvia 6.3% 16.6% 7.0% 0.26%
Source: own calculations. Real numbers.
Table 29. Slow growth, early accession scenario results; synthetic measures.
Columns 2-4: percent of 2004 GDP. Column 5: percent of GDP
Surplus Debt Payments Deficit path
Poland 20.0% 50.5% 21.4% 1.00%
Czech Republic 6.7% 18.0% 6.6% 1.00%
Slovak Republic 15.2% 38.7% 15.6% 1.00%
Hungary 23.2% 56.3% 22.9% 1.00%
Slovenia 14.0% 28.0% 11.7% 1.00%
Latvia 6.2% 15.1% 5.7% 0.90%
Source: own calculations. Real numbers.
Table 30. The early accession scenario gains.
Slow growth projection. Synthetic measures, percent of 2004 GDP.
Surplus Debt Payments Gains
Poland 7.3% 3.8% 8.7% 19.8%
Czech Republic -0.7% 1.5% 0.8% 1.6%
Slovak Republic 4.1% 2.4% 5.5% 12.0%
Hungary 6.0% 3.5% 8.3% 17.8%
Slovenia 4.6% 1.8% 4.9% 11.3%
Latvia 0.2% 1.5% 1.3% 3.0%
Source: own calculations.
As  it  may  be  seen,  the  final  results  of  comparison  between  the  late  and  early  accession
scenarios (“gains” column of the above table) are very similar to those presented in table 15, where
the fast growth scenarios are compared. It could mean that the pace of economic growth is not so
important  for  the  benefits  offered  by  quicker  EMU  accession.  Of  course,  its  higher  level
substantially helps to reduce the real debt to GDP ratio (by definition), and leaves the countries in
better situation at the end of the simulation, as compared to the slower growth projection results.
However, it does not fundamentally affect the gains coming from faster accession. Slow growth
does  require  bigger  effort  in  terms  of  fiscal  adjustment,  but  very  similar  benefits  may  still  be
achieved from not delaying the EMU accession date. The faster decrease of the interest rates in
the 2007 EMU entry variant appears to be the main reason of this scenario advantages.Studies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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It may be noted that the overall gains of the earlier EMU accession are slightly lower in the
slow growth version of the analysis (compare the last columns of Tables 15 & 30). This is due to
the fact that five of the six countries had to adopt the fastest possible deficit reduction path of 1% of
GDP p.a. in the early accession, slow growth simulation (Table 29). Since the upper limit for
deficit  reduction  (or  surplus  increase)  was  so  widely  met  in  this  scenario,  the  countries’
performance had to be limited as compared to the fast growth, early accession version (Table
14). In the latter, only one country – Poland - was forced to choose the fastest path in an (failed)
attempt to meet all the projection assumptions (Table 8).
9. Conclusions
For all the countries analyzed in this paper, choosing the faster EMU accession scenario would
bring  substantial  benefits.  These  effects  are  the  bigger,  the  worse  are  the  country’s  initial
conditions, that is: the higher the interest rate, the greater the debt ratio, and the larger the primary
deficit.  The  pace  of  GDP  growth  shows  no  substantial  effect  on  gains  offered  by  the  faster
accession. On the other hand, a country does not have to be in a bad situation in order to benefit
from faster EMU accession scenario: even the Czech Republic and Latvia (both with moderate
debt, low level of interest rates and small deficits) do benefit from not moving the EMU accession
date five years into the future.
Is it, however, the case of all countries? It was mentioned before, that Lithuania and Estonia
are to be discussed – this is the moment to do so. The two Baltic republics are in quite similar - and
very good - positions. Estonia enjoys interest rates very close to the projection target value (4.7 in
2002  vs.  4.0  in  the  projection)  and  its  public  debt  is  virtually  non-existing  (~3%  of  the  GDP).
Lithuania does have moderate (~20% of the GDP) level of public debt, but other indicators produce
an excellent picture. Interest rate equals to 4.2% (almost as low as the 4.0% target assumed in our
simulation) and the budget records primary surpluses. Since for both countries the high growth
assumption would be a realistic one, the GDP growth rate would exceed the interest rate in every
year covered by the projection. So, as far as this analysis is concerned, the debt to GDP ratio
would fall  even  if  the  interest  payments  were  not  paid  (and  were  increasing  the  debt  nominal
value).
This means that the current macroeconomic indicators are so good, that even serious lag in
the  EMU  accession  could  not  produce  any  substantial  costs,  according  to  the  projection.
Therefore, the results for Lithuania and Estonia are not presented, as the projections do not give
any differentials between their two accession scenarios. One may only conclude that there are
some new EU member countries, for which there are no obvious fiscal benefits of making an early 
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EMU entry. The reason is simple – in fact both Estonia and Lithuania are already in the Euro zone,
having the Euro-denominated currency boards. This means that those countries do not really have
to care, if they formally join the monetary union sooner or later. Of course, this is said according to
the terms of this projection.
Appendix 1. Detailed results of the slow growth scenarios
Table 16. Poland, slow growth, late accession scenario
Poland 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.5% 0.5% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.0% 3.9%
Domestic Debt 32.3% 34.0% 35.6% 37.1% 38.5% 39.7% 40.6% 41.4% 42.2%
Foreign Debt 21.1% 22.5% 22.7% 21.6% 19.3% 15.6% 11.5% 7.8% 4.0%
Total Debt 53.4% 56.5% 58.3% 58.8% 57.7% 55.2% 52.2% 49.2% 46.2%
Interest Rate 8.0% 7.4% 6.9% 6.3% 5.7% 5.1% 4.6% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.14 1.18 1.21 1.24 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.28 1.28
Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 17. Czech Republic, slow growth, late accession scenario
Czech Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.5% -0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Domestic Debt 18.3% 18.8% 19.2% 19.6% 19.5% 18.6% 17.3% 17.0% 16.6%
Foreign Debt 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 19.4% 20.0% 20.2% 20.5% 19.5% 18.6% 17.3% 17.0% 16.6%
Interest Rate 4.2% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 18. Slovak Republic, slow growth, late accession scenario
Slovak Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.4% 1.0% 1.6% 2.1% 2.7% 3.2% 3.7% 1.4% 1.4%
Domestic Debt 29.2% 30.6% 31.9% 33.2% 34.3% 35.3% 36.2% 35.8% 35.1%
Foreign Debt 11.5% 11.4% 10.6% 9.2% 6.9% 4.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 40.7% 42.0% 42.6% 42.3% 41.2% 39.2% 36.5% 35.8% 35.1%
Interest Rate 7.5% 7.0% 6.5% 6.0% 5.5% 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.20 1.22 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23
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Table 19. Hungary, slow growth, late accession scenario
Hungary 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 1.7% 2.3% 2.8% 3.3% 3.8% 4.4% 4.5% 2.1% 2.0%
Domestic Debt 44.0% 46.2% 48.3% 50.3% 52.1% 53.6% 53.1% 52.1% 51.1%
Foreign Debt 15.3% 14.3% 12.5% 10.0% 6.7% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 59.2% 60.5% 60.9% 60.3% 58.7% 56.2% 53.1% 52.1% 51.1%
Interest Rate 7.7% 7.2% 6.7% 6.1% 5.6% 5.1% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.13 1.16 1.19 1.22 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 20. Slovenia, slow growth, late accession scenario
Slovenia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3% 1.0% 1.0%
Domestic Debt 16.5% 17.4% 18.2% 18.9% 19.6% 20.2% 20.7% 21.1% 21.5%
Foreign Debt 15.1% 15.1% 14.5% 13.2% 11.3% 8.8% 5.7% 4.8% 3.9%
Total Debt 31.7% 32.5% 32.6% 32.1% 30.9% 29.0% 26.4% 25.9% 25.4%
Interest Rate 7.8% 7.3% 6.7% 6.2% 5.6% 5.1% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.15 1.19 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 21. Latvia, slow growth, late accession scenario
Latvia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% 0.6% 0.6%
Domestic Debt 6.4% 6.6% 6.8% 6.9% 7.1% 7.3% 7.4% 7.6% 7.7%
Foreign Debt 10.1% 10.4% 10.4% 10.1% 9.5% 8.6% 7.3% 6.9% 6.5%
Total Debt 16.5% 17.0% 17.2% 17.0% 16.6% 15.8% 14.8% 14.5% 14.2%
Interest Rate 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 4.7% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 22. Poland, slow growth, early accession scenario
Poland 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus -0.5% 0.5% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 4.0% 3.1% 1.8% 1.7%
Domestic Debt 32.0% 33.1% 33.8% 34.4% 35.1% 35.8% 36.5% 37.2% 37.9%
Foreign Debt 20.8% 21.3% 20.2% 18.0% 14.9% 11.2% 8.3% 6.7% 5.1%
Total Debt 52.8% 54.4% 53.9% 52.5% 50.0% 47.0% 44.8% 43.9% 43.0%
Interest Rate 7.1% 5.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data. 
                 Studies & Analyses No. 277 – Fiscal Costs of Delaying the EMU Accession …
26
Table 23. Czech Republic, slow growth, early accession scenario
Czech Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
Domestic Debt 17.7% 18.0% 17.3% 16.9% 16.6% 16.3% 16.0% 15.7% 15.3%
Foreign Debt 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 18.7% 18.0% 17.3% 16.9% 16.6% 16.3% 16.0% 15.7% 15.3%
Interest Rate 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 24. Slovak Republic, slow growth, early accession scenario
Slovak Republic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.9% 1.9% 2.9% 1.6% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3%
Domestic Debt 28.9% 29.9% 30.5% 31.1% 31.7% 32.3% 32.9% 33.6% 33.0%
Foreign Debt 10.9% 9.5% 6.9% 5.4% 4.1% 2.8% 1.4% 0.1% 0.0%
Total Debt 39.8% 39.4% 37.3% 36.5% 35.8% 35.1% 34.4% 33.7% 33.0%
Interest Rate 6.7% 5.3% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 25. Hungary, slow growth, early accession scenario
Hungary 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 2.2% 3.2% 4.2% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9%
Domestic Debt 43.6% 45.1% 46.0% 46.9% 47.8% 48.7% 49.7% 49.0% 48.1%
Foreign Debt 14.5% 12.0% 8.0% 6.2% 4.2% 2.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Debt 58.1% 57.1% 54.0% 53.1% 52.0% 51.0% 50.0% 49.0% 48.1%
Interest Rate 6.8% 5.4% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
Table 26. Slovenia, slow growth, early accession scenario
Slovenia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Domestic Debt 16.4% 16.9% 17.3% 17.6% 18.0% 18.3% 18.7% 19.0% 19.4%
Foreign Debt 14.3% 12.5% 9.3% 8.8% 7.9% 7.0% 6.2% 5.3% 4.5%
Total Debt 30.7% 29.4% 26.5% 26.4% 25.8% 25.3% 24.8% 24.4% 23.9%
Interest Rate 6.9% 5.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.14 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.Studies & Analyses No. 277 Michał Gorzelak                                                                                          
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Table 27. Latvia, slow growth, early accession scenario
Latvia 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP growth 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Deficit (-) or surplus 0.5% 1.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Domestic Debt 6.2% 6.4% 6.5% 6.6% 6.8% 6.9% 7.0% 7.2% 7.3%
Foreign Debt 9.5% 8.4% 8.0% 7.6% 7.2% 6.8% 6.4% 6.0% 5.6%
Total Debt 15.8% 14.8% 14.5% 14.2% 14.0% 13.7% 13.4% 13.1% 12.9%
Interest Rate 4.9% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0%
Exchange Rate Index 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
 Source: own calculations based on IMF data.
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